Most central banks are staffed by unelected bureaucrats and are outside the realm of political control. The Treasurer, no matter how much he may disagree, is bound by convention not to interfere with the monetary policy decisions of the bank.
This state of affairs has insulated central banks from accountability. Parliament does not control the Reserve Bank of Australia’s budget, as it does for the High Court.
Full disclosures of monetary policy dealings domestically and internationally are not accessible. The RBA’s exemption from Freedom of Information laws prevents the public from finding out the extent of its relationships with external actors. Like the Fed, no parliamentary committee truly oversees every aspect of its decision-making, meaning it is probably more secretive than the Australian Security Intelligence Service.
A good way to improve accountability is to audit the RBA. Comprehensive audits can reveal useful information about how a central bank is employing its discretionary powers.
Opponents of an audit argue that opening up the bank's books would impinge on its "independence". Let's assume, for the sake of argument, that central bank independence is a good thing. Even so, it's unlikely that expanding the scope of audits would significantly affect independence. Protections can be put in place to minimise this risk. Not all documents discovered during an audit need to be made public. Some can be viewed privately by the inspector-general in charge of accountability. Appropriate safeguards, such as time lags between a monetary policy decision and an audit of the decision, can also be implemented.
Thus, there is no excuse for not providing citizens a better understanding of the RBA's shenanigans.